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COMPETING FOR CAPITAL: THE
DIFFUSION OF BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, 1960-2000'
Zachary Elkins*
Andrew T Guzman**
Beth Simmons***
Beginning in the early 1960s, bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
have become the primary international legal mechanism for the gov-
ernance of foreign direct investment. These agreements establish the
terms and conditions for private investment by nationals and compa-
nies of one country in the jurisdiction of another.
In this article, Professors Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons ex-
plore the advent and spread of BITs, observing a trend, over time, of
increased economic and political similarity between new BIT part-
ners. The authors present a theory that host governments and inves-
tors view BITs as devices that raise the expected return on investments
by making credible commitments to treat foreign investors fairly. The
article proposes a set of hypotheses based on this competitive theory
and develops an empirical strategy for testing them against alternative
explanations. The resulting findings provide evidence that competi-
tion is central to the spread of BITs and that both traditional eco-
nomic explanations and dyadic characteristics explain BIT signings.
After developing and testing this theory with data through 2000,
a postscript analyzes additional data from 2000-2006, finding a de-
cline in the overall rate of new signings, but an increase in BITs
t With the exception of the "postscript," a version of this Article was previously published in
the Fall 2006 issue of International Organization.
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among lower-income countries. Based on this new data, the authors
conclude that the basic competitive dynamic model remains intact.
The global market for productive capital is more integrated than
ever before. The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) is a clear ex-
ample. According to World Bank data, average gross FDI as a percent-
age of a country's GDP increased seven fold from 1.2% to 8.9% between
1970 and 2000.1 Though such investments tend to be highly skewed
across jurisdictions-developed countries account for more than 93% of
outflows and 71% of inflows2 -foreign capital has come to play a much
more visible role in many more countries worldwide.
It is widely recognized that economic globalization requires market-
supporting institutions to flourish. But unlike with trade and monetary
relations, almost no multilateral rules for FDI exist.3 Direct investments
in developing countries are overwhelmingly governed by bilateral in-
vestment treaties (BITs). BITs are agreements establishing the terms
and conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one
country in the jurisdiction of another. Virtually all BITs cover four sub-
stantive areas: FDI admission, FDI treatment, FDI expropriation, and
the settlement of disputes. These bilateral arrangements have prolifer-
ated over the past forty-five years-especially in the past two decades-
even as political controversies have plagued efforts to establish a multi-
lateral regime for FDI.
Why the profusion of bilateral agreements? The popularity of BITs
contrasts sharply with the collective resistance developing countries have
shown toward proinvestment principles under customary international
law and the failure of the international community to make progress on a
multilateral investment agreement.4 On its face, this seems to suggest
that BITs do not simply reflect the ready acceptance of dominant inter-
national property rights norms. Our theory is that the proliferation of
BITs-and the liberal property rights regime they embody-is propelled
in good part by the competition among potential host countries for
credible property rights protections required by direct investors.
1. Figures calculated by the authors from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
2. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION:
FACTS AND FIGuREs at 32, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/CSIR/2004/1, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.16
(2004). Data on foreign direct investment is also available from the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development-Foreign Direct Investment Database, which can be accessed at http://stats.
unctad.org/FDI (last visited Aug. 28, 2007).
3. For a review of the relevant legal literature, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1994); Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation
of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (1981); Michael S. Minor, The Demise of Expropriation as an
Instrument of LDC Policy, 1980-1992, 25 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 177 (1994); Detlev F. Vagts, Foreign In-
vestment Risk Reconsidered: The View from the 1980s, 2 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1
(1987).
4. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 651-57 (1998).
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The article is organized as follows. The first section describes the
spread of BITs in some detail. The second section presents a model of
competition for investment that could lead to diffusion among competi-
tors. The third section discusses the methods we use to test our proposi-
tions, as well as a range of alternatives. The fourth section discusses our
findings. Our data is consistent with competitive pressures for BIT pro-
liferation: governments are influenced by competitors' policies and by
the mobility of FDI in manufactures, which tends to intensify competi-
tion among hosts. We interpret our findings as evidence of pressure for
certain governments to adopt capital-friendly policies in highly competi-
tive global capital markets.
I. SECURING INVESTORS' LEGAL RIGHTS
A. From Customary Law to Bilateral Investment Treaties
FDI has always been subject to contractual and political hazards
that raise the expected costs of investing.5 Before the use of BITs, few
mechanisms existed to make state promises about the treatment of for-
eign investment credible.6 As expressed succinctly in the "Hull Rule,"
customary international law provided that "no government is entitled to
expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision
for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore."7 Apart from
the obvious problem of enforcement, this approach did not allow poten-
tial hosts to voluntarily signal their intent to contract in good faith.
Both customary international law and its practice were under attack
by developing country hosts by the 1950s. The nationalization of British
oil assets by Iran in 1951, the expropriation of Liamco's concessions in
Libya in 1955, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt a year
later served notice of a new militancy on the part of investment hosts. 8
The nationalization of sugar interests by Cuba in the 1960s further un-
dercut assumptions about the security of international investments.9
Meanwhile, collective resistance to the Hull Rule in the United Nations
was on the rise. In 1962 the UN General Assembly adopted the "Resolu-
5. Witold J. Henisz, The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment, 16 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 334,336-40 (2000).
6. For a discussion of the historical protection of foreign investment, see CHARLES LIPSON,
STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES (1985).
7. See Letter from Cordell Hull to the Mexican Government (Aug. 22, 1938), in 3 GREEN
HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 288 (1942). The Rule itself predates
Cordell Hull's statement, and various statements of it can be found in decisions from the early part of
the twentieth century. See Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 7, at 21;
Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration (Nor. V. U.S.), 1 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 307, 316 (1922).
8. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 647 (noting that "former colonies became newly independent
sates and sought to flex their newfound sovereignty-sometimes by seizing assets from foreigners who
had been granted rights by a colonial power").
9. Id. at 646-47.
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tion on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources" that provided
for merely "appropriate" compensation in the event of expropriation."t
Several more United Nations resolutions followed in the 1970s," along
with a string of undercompensated expropriations around the world.
1 2
Bilateral treaties made their debut in the late 1950s, just as consen-
sus on customary rules began to erode. As compared with other mecha-
nisms for protecting foreign investment,'3 BITs have proven innovative in
a number of respects. They require an explicit commitment on the part
of the potential host government and involve direct negotiations with the
government of potential investors. In this way, BITs up the political ante
for the host government and raise expectations of performance. The
typical BIT offers a wider array of substantive protections than did the
customary rule. For example, BITs typically require national treatment
and most-favored-nation treatment of foreign investments in the host
country. 4 They also typically protect contractual rights, 5 guaranty the
right to transfer profits in hard currency to the home country,' 6 and pro-
hibit or restrict the use of performance requirements. 7 Finally, and per-
10. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 1 4, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962).
11. These are discussed in LIPSON, supra note 6, at 88-89. In 1966 the General Assembly reaf-
firmed states' rights to nationalize resources without reference to international legal principles. Id. at
88. In 1972, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 3041 (XXVII), which contained an en-
dorsement of the Trade and Development Board's resolution 88 (XII) of 19 October 1972, regarding
permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and claimed that compensation for natural resource
nationalization cases was to be fixed by the nationalizing state with jurisdiction for such cases falling
within the sole jurisdiction of the nationalizing country's courts. The 1973 Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Resolution 3171) stated that in the event of nationalization,
"each State is entitled to determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment."
G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 17, 1973). The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, which specified the right of each state "[t]o nationalize, expropriate or transfer
ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances
that the State considers pertinent" with national courts taking jurisdiction in case of disputes (Art.
2(c)). G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974).
12. See Stephen J. Kobrin, Foreign Enterprise and Forced Divestment in the LDCs, 34 INT'L
ORG. 65, 75 (1980).
13. Other mechanisms have been used to try to protect foreign investment, of course. One pos-
sibility since 1988 is to apply for insurance through the World Bank's Multilateral Insurance Guaran-
tee Agency (MIGA). MIGA covers risks associated with transfer restriction, expropriation, breach of
contract, and risks relating to war and civil disturbances. See Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, http://www.miga.org/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2007). U.S. businesses can also insure against risks
associated with currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence by applying for invest-
ment insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a U.S. government
agency. See Overseas Private Investment Corporation, http://www.opic.gov/Insurance/ (last visited
Aug. 25, 2007).
14. See, e.g., Office of the Chief Counsel for Int'l Commerce, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1994
U.S. Prototype Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 11 (1-2) (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review). For convenience throughout this article we label the more developed partner in a BIT the
"home" country (meaning the home of investors) and the less developed partner the "host." The
treaty obligations bind both parties, but in the vast majority of treaties there is a developed country
that will be the source of most FDI and a developing country that will be the recipient.
15. See, e.g., id. art. I(d)(iii).
16. See, e.g., id. art. VI.
17. See, e.g., id. art. V(1-2).
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haps most importantly, BITs provide for international arbitration of dis-
putes between the investor and the host country,"8 typically through the
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL).
B. The Spread of BITs
Despite the aggressive campaign waged by some developing coun-
tries against the relevant customary international law, BITs were em-
braced by many potential host governments.19 Figure 1 documents the
geometric growth of both investment treaties and mean inflows of FDI as
a percentage of GDP from 1960 to 2000. As seen in Table 1, early BITs
typically involved a midsized European power and one of the least de-
veloped countries, often in Africa. The negotiation of BITs proceeded at
a moderate pace until the mid-1980s, rarely exceeding twenty new trea-
ties per year. Late in the decade the rate of signings accelerated dra-
matically, with an average of more than one hundred new treaties a year
throughout the 1990s. But as we will discuss in the postscript, the rate of
BIT signings has tapered off noticeably since 2000.
TABLE 1
THE FIRST FORTY BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES SIGNED
Investing country
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Switzerland
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Germany
Host country
Dominican Republic
Pakistan
Malaysia
Greece
Tunisia
Togo
Thailand
Liberia
Morocco
Niger
Cote d'Ivoire
Guinea
Cameroon
Year BIT signed
1959
1959
1960
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
ntinued on next page)
18, See, e.g., id. arts. IX, X.
19. It is interesting to note, however, that some of the most vociferous opponents of the Hull
Rule were in fact late comers to the BITs movement. As of the late 1990s, Mexico, for example, had
signed only two BITs, one with Spain and one with Switzerland. Brazil did not sign a BIT until 1994,
and none of its ten bilateral agreements had entered into force as of the late 1990s. India's pattern is
similar to that of Brazil. See The World Bank Group, Bilateral Investment Treaties, http://www.
worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
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TABLE 1-Continued
TABLE 
1--Continued
The United States embraced BITs later than did its Western Euro-
pean counterparts. Between 1962 and 1972, during which time West
Germany entered into forty-six BITs and Switzerland entered into
twenty-seven, the United States eschewed such treaties and signed only
two Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: one with Togo and
one with Thailand.21 One reason for the delayed U.S. participation in bi-
lateral arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral
approach. The United States was one of the most aggressive proponents
of the Hull Rule 21 and may have feared that BITs represented a threat to
20. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 208 (1988).
21. See Guzman, supra note 4, at 646-49.
Investing country
Switzerland
Switzerland
Germany
Germany
Germany
Switzerland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Switzerland
Germany
Germany
Germany
Italy
Switzerland
Germany
Germany
Switzerland
Belgium-
Luxemburg
Germany
Switzerland
Switzerland
Germany
Switzerland
Germany
Netherlands
Netherlands
Sweden
Host country
Congo
Senegal
Guinea
Turkey
Madagascar
Rwanda
Tunisia
Liberia
Cameroon
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Sudan
Guinea
Togo
Senegal
Niger
Madagascar
Tunisia
Korea
Tanzania
Malta
Sierra Leone
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Cameroon
Cote d'Ivoire
Cote d'Ivoire
Year BIT signed
1962
1962
1962
1962
1962
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
1963
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1964
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
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its claim that investment was already protected under customary interna-
tional law. Moreover, potential hosts may have had incentives to resist
the relatively onerous provisions the U.S. government typically tried to
secure. One of the prime differences between the terms typically offered
by the Europeans and the United States at this time was the former's
emphasis on investment protection and the latter's additional insistence
on liberalization.2
FIGURE 1
NUMBER OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES SIGNED AND MEAN
GLOBAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AS A PROPORTION OF GDP, BY
YEAR, 1959-1999
N broffT ti Signed
Av~~ntlA- F-igp Direr I- -xan
900 19'70 90 ,s1990 2000
Y_
It was not until 1981 that the United States changed its view on
BITs. There is evidence that some officials in the administration of U.S.
President Ronald Reagan viewed BITs as an alternative way to protect
the principles contained in the embattled Hull Rule. Secretary of State
George Shultz argued that BITs were designed "to protect investment
not only by treaty but also by reinforcing traditional international legal
principles and practice regarding foreign direct private investment."23 By
the mid-1980s, the United States pursued investor protection in the same
fashion as did the Europeans. Shultz noted in his communication with
the president after completion of six BITs in 1986 that their "approach
followed similar programs that had been undertaken with considerable
success by a number of European countries, including the Federal Re-
22. Hilda Fridh & Olivia Jensen, Multilateral or Bilateral Investment Negotiations: Where Can
Developing Countries Make Themselves Heard? (CUTS International, Briefing Paper No. 9, 2002),
available at http://cuts-intemational.org/9-2002.pdf. Some observers note that the insistence on liber-
alization explains the inability of the United States to secure agreements with East and Southeast
Asian countries until quite recent years. See Michael R. Reading, Note, The Bilateral Investment
Treaty in ASEAN: A Comparative Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 679 (1992).
23. Letter of Submittal of U.S.-Turkey Bilateral Investment Treaty from George P. Shultz, U.S.
Secretary of State, to Ronald Reagan, U.S. President (Feb. 19, 1986), available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/43615.pdf (emphasis added).
No. 11
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public of Germany and the United Kingdom since the early 1960s. '' 24 By
the late 1980s, most analysts would agree that governments in countries
home to large multinational corporations (MNCs) had nearly converged
on a single treaty model. Developing countries could, increasingly, opt
to take it or to leave it. As Figure 1 attests, many did the former.
Early on, BITs were primarily agreements between countries of
starkly varying developmental levels and political traditions. Figure 2
plots the mean difference in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
between BIT partners as well as that between states in all other dyads "at
risk" of signing in a given year. The resulting curve demonstrates that
the economic differences within these dyads have declined fairly substan-
tially over time, even while the wealth disparities between non-BIT dy-
ads have increased. As is the case with wealth, the "political gap" be-
tween new BIT signers has also diminished significantly over the past
thirty years. Figure 3 plots the mean difference in the level of democracy
(as measured by Polity scores) of BIT partners in the year of their sign-
ing against that of all other dyads at risk of signing. Over time, new BIT
partners have become more similar. This is evidence that the institution
is spreading to a population of dyads of similar political and economic
structure who, presumably, also have less reason to sign such agree-
ments. This trend has continued and intensified in the past three years,
as we discuss below.
FIGURE 2
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN GDP PER CAPITA BETWEEN DYAD MEMBERS
• . • yads Signing BITs• .
C 0
All Dyads at Risk
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
Note: Data points shown are for dyads signing BITS.
24. Id. The six BITs were with Turkey, Morocco, Haiti, Panama, Senegal, and Zaire. Id.
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FIGURE 3
MEAN DIFFERENCE IN DEMOCRACY BETWEEN DYAD MEMBERS
a. 0
0 Dyads Signing BITs
0
0All Dyads at Risk 0.
0 000 0
19E60 19'70 19'80 1990 2000
Year
Note: Data points shown are for dyads signing BITS.
By the late 1990s, there emerged a few twists to the basic theme of
wealthy countries picking off potentially lucrative but risky venues one at
a time. From about 1999, developing countries began a rather more-
proactive effort to create bilateral investment treaties among themselves.
These activities have been coordinated through the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sometimes with the as-
sistance of a major capital exporting country, such as Germany or
France. During a meeting jointly sponsored by UNCTAD, the Swiss
government, and a group of fifteen developing countries (G-15), seven
developing countries signed eight bilateral treaties among themselves.
Individual developing countries soon began to seize the initiative. At the
request of Thailand, a minilateral conference yielded seven more BITs
among developing countries, and furthered discussions on several more.
Bolivia (2000), India (2001), and Croatia (2001) initiated minilateral dis-
cussions on a similar model.2 France participated in a round of discus-
sions, primarily among the Francophone countries, in 2001 that attracted
25. These seven countries were Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Zim-
babwe. Press Release, UNCTAD, Seven G-15 Countries Negotiated Eight Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties Hosted by UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TAD/INF/PR/99002 (Jan. 14,1999).
26. Treaties were formed between Thailand and Argentina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Slovenia, and
Zimbabwe, as well as between Croatia and Zimbabwe. Sweden also participated and concluded a BIT
with Thailand. Press Release, UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties Signed in Bangkok, U.N.
Doc. TAD/INFPR/025X (Feb. 18,2000).
27. UNCTAD, Rounds of Negotiations of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation
Treaties, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=2327&lang=l (last visited Aug. 25,
2007).
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twenty participants and yielded forty-two BITs.' Many of these involved
noncontiguous, poor, highly indebted African countries for which it is
difficult to imagine much benefit.29 (What are the chances that capital
from Burkina Faso would flow to Chad, or investors from Benin would
soon demand entr6e to Mali?) More understandable from an economic
point of view, was the German-funded and -supported meeting in Octo-
ber 2001 that drew together seven capital-poor countries (five of which
were officially "highly indebted poor countries") and four wealthy Euro-
pean countries,3" yielding both understandable (e.g., Belgium-Cambodia)
and bizarre (e.g., Sudan-Zambia) bilateral treaty combinations.31 This
recent turn toward BITs between developing states is more difficult for
our theory to explain. It does seem to suggest that more political or so-
ciological explanations may recently have become increasingly relevant
in some regions. However, these cases are still relatively few and of such
recent vintage that they do not affect the broader relationships we report
below.
C. Leaders and Followers in BIT Agreements
BITs present potential benefits for both capital-exporting and capi-
tal-importing countries. But which group of countries initiates and drives
the signing of such agreements? Our theory, to anticipate the following
section, assumes that potential host countries have an important (al-
though not exclusive) role in initiating or nurturing BIT negotiations. Is
this a plausible assumption? After all, power-based theories-or "coer-
cive" theories in the language of Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett32 -
suggest that dominant capital-exporting countries such as Germany or
the United States control the agenda and begin BIT negotiations accord-
ing to their schedule and needs. Indeed, the chronology described above
suggests that some home countries establish BIT "programs" and sign
agreements with a slate of developing countries in concentrated periods
of time.
If the dominant powers determine the BIT schedule, then we should
see evidence of home country "programs" when we look at BITs, by
country, across time. Programs would look like clusters, or peaks, of ac-
28. See id.
29. Press Release, UNCTAD, 29 Bilateral Investment Treaties Signed by Least Developed
Countries in Brussels, U.N. Doc. LCDII/PRESS/08/REV.1 (May 18,2001).
30. Participants included Cambodia, Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia,
Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden. UNCTAD, Progress Report: Work Undertaken with
UNCTAD's Work Programme on International Investment Agreements Between the l0th Conference of
UNCTAD, Bangkok, February 2000 and July 2002,8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/2002 58 (2002).
31. Notice that even multilateral meetings of this sort have not yielded multilateral treaties on
investment. The states involved have always chosen instead to sign a series of BITs. The question of
why multilateral approaches are not adopted is interesting, but we leave it for another day.
32. Beth A. Simmons et al., Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism, 60 INT'L
ORG. 781, 790 (2006).
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tivity in certain eras in a home country's history. By the same logic, if
host countries take a lead role in producing BITs, their histories would
also show some evidence of concerted, programmatic activity. Figures 4
and 5 chart the number of BITs signed since 1959 for the twelve most ac-
tive BIT signatories from both home (Figure 4) and host (Figure 5) coun-
tries. It appears that most home countries' histories show BIT activity
lasting at least twenty years; most of these countries, in fact, signed BITs
throughout the forty-year period. Spain is an exception, with a short
spate of BITs in the 1990s only. Potential hosts, however, demonstrate a
different pattern: their BIT signings spike up in a more clustered pattern,
one indicative of programmatic activity (Figure 5).
FIGURE 4
NUMBER OF BITs SIGNED, BY HOME COUNTRY, 1959-1999
Gerrnnny Switzerland France United Kingdom
960 1970 1980 990 2000 990 90 1980 I990 2000 1960 1970 1980 2990 2000 190 1970 1980 1999 2000
Italy Netherlands Belgium Spain
,1 I
0
=E4 1% 970 1990 I9O020971W 980 299o 2090 1949 90o I990 I9 2000 19 2970 980 I9 290z
Sweden Denmark United States Finland
4, * [,Ii o, . .... ____ Ii I11
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1900 2979 1980 2990 2000 1990 1970 1980 I990 2009 1990 2970 I 989 1 990 2000
Year
Note: Figure includes the twelve most active BIT signers among capital-
exporting countries.
Evidence of programmatic activity can be established statistically as
well. Comparing the average kurtosis33 for the historical distribution of
BITs among both home and host countries, it is clear that the distribu-
tion of BITs over the past forty years is significantly more peaked (less
uniform) for the host than it is for home countries (9.11 and 4.48, respec-
tively). The standard deviation of their distributions over time is also
lower for host countries than it is for home countries (7.08 versus 9.39,
33. Kurtosis is the degree to which a distribution is peaked, or clustered. High kurtosis indicates
clustered data, and low kurtosis indicates a more uniform distribution.
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respectively), suggesting a more clustered pattern of activity for the host.
If BITs are driven by home country programs, it is not especially appar-
ent in the data. Rather, it appears that potential hosts are more likely to
sign in clusters-suggesting that while the major capital exporters stand
ready with model treaties in hand, the decision of whether and when to
sign is, to a large extent, left to the host.
FIGURE 5
NUMBER OF BITS SIGNED, BY HOST COUNTRY, 1959-1999
Chi-a Romania Egypt Malaysia
196 1970 1980 99 2000 90 1970 1900 990 20M IW t1D 9 0 200O 9 0 1970 9o 1990 2000
Poland Korea Turkey Bulgaria
E IJA
= 90 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 1080 190 2 960 1970 19 990 2000 960 970 190 0 200I
Argentina Russia Czech Republi Indonesia
960 1970 1980 19 2000 10 1970 1980 1990 2000 960 1970 1980 1990 2000 1960 1970 198t 2990 2000
Year
Note: Figure includes the twelve most active BIT signers among capital-
importing countries.
The notion that home countries make take-it-or-leave-it offers to
potential hosts and that hosts eventually decide to sign BITs is consistent
with the observed content of BITs. These treaties tend to provide consis-
tent terms, even across different home countries. In particular, the core
terms of the treaties are almost always present: mandatory dispute reso-
lution before an international arbitration body, a private right of action
for investors, monetary compensation in the event of a violation, national
treatment, and most-favored-nation treatment.34  This uniformity sug-
gests that host countries are price takers with respect to the terms of
these treaties, consistent with our assumptions. In essence, each home
country has market power over the terms that will govern investment by
34. See, e.g., Dana H. Freyer & David Herlihy, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and Dispute Set-
tlement in Investment Arbitration: Just How "Favored" Is "Most-Favored"?, 20 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 58, 58-59 (2005).
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its locals. Host countries, on the other hand, realize that they must com-
pete with other potential hosts, and therefore cannot demand changes to
the core provisions of the treaties.
II. A COMPETITIVE THEORY OF BIT DIFFUSION
Our theory of BIT diffusion has a simple structure." BITs are
viewed by host governments and investors as devices that raise the ex-
pected rates of return on investments. The treaties do this by assisting
governments in making credible commitments to treat foreign investors
"fairly"-as described in the previous section. BITs give host govern-
ments a competitive edge in attracting capital if doubts otherwise exist
about their willingness to enforce contracts fairly.36 Accordingly, gov-
ernments with little inherent credibility are more likely to sign BITs than
are governments known for their fair treatment of foreign capital. The
result is a competitive dynamic among potential hosts to reduce the risks
and enhance the profitability of investing.
A. BITs as a Credible Commitment
Governments may have many motives to sign a BIT, but the most
significant is to make a credible commitment to treat foreign investors
fairly. BITs allow governments to make credible commitments because
they raise the ex post costs of noncompliance above those that might be
incurred in the absence of the treaty. They do this by (1) clarifying the
commitment, (2) explicitly involving the home country's government,
and (3) enhancing enforcement.3 7
35. For a further elaboration of the concept of "diffusion," see Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons,
On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 33, 33 (2005).
36. There is debate in the literature about the impact of BITs on investment flows. The small
number of papers on the subject have generated inconsistent results. The most recent and sophisti-
cated study of which we are aware, however, concludes that BITs do, indeed, increase FDI and serve
as a substitute for good domestic institutional quality. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV.
1567, 1582 (2005). Other relevant studies exist. See UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the
Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998); Mary Hallward-
Driemeier, Do Bilateral Treaties Attract FDI? Only A Bit... And They Could Bite (World Bank Dev.
Research Group, Working Paper No. 3121, 2003); Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign
Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 293, 2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121.
37. We cast our argument in the credible commitments framework, but our competition argu-
ment may be compatible with signaling theories as well. Some of the empirical implications would be
different than those we describe here, however. If a BIT is a signaling device, we would expect more
reliable rather than less reliable property rights protectors to sign them. We might also expect less
reliable governments to sign one, rather than multiple treaties, since one should suffice to send the
signal. Empirically, we tend to observe multiple signings per host, which leads us to frame the issue as
one of credible commitments rather than costly signals that reveal type. Both frameworks could, how-
ever, explain a competitive dynamic to sign BITs.
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BITs raise ex post costs of reneging on contracts by reducing the
ambiguity of the host government's obligations. BITs are much more
precise than customary international law in this area. They also provide
a broader legal framework in which to interpret specific contractual obli-
gations. Precision removes potential avenues of plausible deniability,
making it clearer to a broader range of audiences (i.e., domestic audi-
ences, other foreign investors, other governments), that an obligation has
been disregarded. Clear violations imply a much greater reputational
cost than do actions not clearly barred by law.38
The second way BITs raise ex post costs of reneging is by involving
the investor's government as a treaty party. BITs are negotiated be-
tween sovereign states. State-to-state legal arrangements implicate the
interests of the home government more directly than do simple invest-
ment contracts between private parties and host governments. The
home government has an interest in broader principles of good-faith
treaty observance. Treatment that violates a BIT qualifies as a breach of
the fundamental principle of international law: pacta sunt servanda (trea-
ties are to be observed).39 Reneging on a contract governed by a treaty
arrangement can damage important foreign policy interests.
Finally, BITs raise ex post costs by significantly enhancing contract
enforcement. These agreements contain mandatory dispute settlement
provisions that investors are entitled to use when they feel the host state
has violated the relevant BIT.4 Significantly, investors can begin arbitra-
tion proceedings without the approval or support of their home govern-
ment.41 Moreover, the host can neither prevent the legal proceeding
from going forward, nor control the final decision of the international ar-
bitration tribunal. The international tribunal can require a host found to
be in violation of its obligations to pay monetary damages.42 The sover-
eign host state could, of course, refuse to pay, but that decision could
have even more profound reputational consequences: when a govern-
ment spurns the decision of a neutral authoritative third party with which
it has voluntarily precommitted to comply, a range of important actors-
public and private-are likely to infer that that government is an unreli-
able economic partner. By giving private parties a right to pursue and
receive a legal remedy, BITs boost the credibility of the host govern-
ment's commitment. As a result, we would expect some violations to be
deterred by a BIT commitment, and expected returns on investments to
increase accordingly.
38. See Kenneth Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 419 (2000); An-
drew Guzman, International Law: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823, 1863-65 (2002);
Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495,508-09 (1981).
39. See Abbott et al., supra note 38, at 409.
40. Guzman, supra note 4, at 680-82.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Do these formal dispute settlement mechanisms actually come into
play in the way we have described? Theoretically, we should expect such
arbitrations to be rare, because fully informed parties should be able to
settle out of court and avoid litigation costs. When we do observe arbi-
tration, it would be more likely to indicate information asymmetries than
the seriousness of the case. 3 Nonetheless, a significant number of cases
have in fact gone to arbitration. A recent conservative estimate puts the
number at greater than 160 cases.4 Due largely to controversial meas-
ures taken by its government in early 2002, Argentina alone has recently
been a party to some thirty BIT arbitrations, most of them under ICSID
and the rest under UNCITRAL rules.45 BIT arbitrations have given rise
to a number of significant awards, including recent decisions against the
governments of the Czech Republic ($350 million), Lebanon ($266 mil-
lion), and Ecuador ($70 million).46
In short, BITs represent a credible commitment because of the
range of ex post costs-i.e., diplomatic costs, sovereignty costs, arbitra-
tion costs, and reputational costs-involved in both their observance and
their violation. We argue below that some governments have incentives
to increase these costs in order to attract FDI.
B. Competitive BIT Signings: Logic and Implications
In the previous section we argued that BITs allow governments to
credibly commit themselves to protect investors' property rights. The
ability to do so lowers risks and increases expected returns on invest-
ment. If this is the case, BITs can be a mechanism-such as favorable tax
treatment, lower wages, and efficient infrastructure -for making a juris-
diction a more attractive place in which to invest. As with these other
mechanisms, committing to a BIT involves costs for the host government.
We characterize these as "sovereignty costs." They are the costs any gov-
ernment pays when it negotiates, ratifies, and complies with an invest-
ment treaty. We would include here the political costs of assembling a
43. This point has long been recognized in the law and economics literature. See Lucian A.
Bebchuck, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404, 404-06
(1984).
44. UNCTAD, Occasional Note: International Investment Disputes on the Rise, 1 2, U.N. Doc.
UNCTADIWEB/ITE/ITT/2004/2 (Nov. 29, 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite-
pcbb/docs/webiteiit20042_en.pdf. This number omits, of course, disputes that were resolved prior to
the arbitration stage.
45. See Guido Santiago Tawid, Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends and Recent De-
velopments, http://www.bomchilgroup.orglargmar04.html#16 (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
46. UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES ARISING FROM INVESTMENT TREATIES: A REVIEW
at 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITEIIIT/2005/4, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.1 (2005); George M. Von Mehren
et al., Navigating Through Investor-State Arbitration-An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty
Claims, DIsP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2004, at 3. For examples of awards, see reports of the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, which are available at www.iisd.org/investment. See also Mark
Friedman & Gaetan Verhossel, Arbitration Survey, GLOBAL LITIG., Sept. 15, 2003, available at
http://blog.lewrockwell.cornllewrw/archives/Friedman-BITs-9-15-03.pdf.
No. 11
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
coalition in support of foreign investors' rights, as well as the costs asso-
ciated with giving up a broad range of policy instruments relevant to do-
mestic social or developmental purposes (i.e., taxation, regulation, per-
formance requirements, property seizure, and currency and capital
restrictions). Most striking are the sovereignty costs associated with the
delegation of adjudicative authority: virtually any legal change or rule
that affects foreign investors is potentially subject to review by a foreign
tribunal. 7 The decision to sign a BIT always involves an assessment by
the host of whether the expected benefit of attracting an additional in-
crement of foreign capital outweighs these costs. In many cases, the an-
swer is no. In this section, we discuss the conditions under which the ex-
pected benefits for a particular government might outweigh these
sovereignty costs.
BITs can attract capital from two broad resource pools. First, they
can shift resources from consumption or domestic investment, effectively
stimulating new international capital investments that would not have
been made absent the treaty. Secondly, and more importantly for our
theory, BITs can redirect international capital flows from one venue to
another. A BIT gives the host signatory a reputational advantage over
otherwise comparable rivals in the competition for (re)distribution of an
existing investment pool.4 8 The possibility of investment diversion means
that governments may have competitive reasons to implement BITs. It is
the ability of a BIT-or at a minimum, its perceived ability-to give one
country an advantage over other similarly situated countries in the com-
petition for capital that we hypothesize provokes many BIT signings."9
The strategic structure we are describing creates serious collective
action problems among potential host countries. Collectively, they might
be better off resisting the demands of investors (i.e., avoiding the sover-
eignty costs described above), but individually, it is rational to sign in
hopes of stimulating capital inflows. In recognition of this dynamic, one
finds cases of regional attempts to coordinate host resistance. In the Car-
ibbean, for example, collective efforts have been made to reduce BIT
concessions," though predictably the "cartel" has been difficult to main-
47. See Luke Peterson, Changing Investment Litigation, Bit by BIT, BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE
& SUSTAINABLE DEV., May 2001, at 11 (describing the use of tribunals in NAFTA, a cousin to BITs).
48. This redistributive effect contrasts with customary international law, under which all poten-
tial hosts have the same obligations and enjoy the same benefits.
49. For a more complete discussion of the potential impact of competition on BITs, see Guzman,
supra note 4, at 669-70.
50. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries, for example, produced a document entitled
"Guidelines for use in the Negotiation of Bilateral Treaties" that states, among other things, that
CARICOM countries should not accept any restriction on the use of performance obligations and that
they should retain the right to nationalize and to "determine at the time of the nationalisation the
quantum of compensation and the terms of payment." 3 UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM at 139-40, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTCI/30(Vol. III), U.N. Sales No.
E.96.II.A.11 (1996).
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tain.51 The breakdown of such efforts is consistent with the competitive
context we believe accounts for the proliferation of BITs over the past
several years.
A competitive theory of BITs has at least four observable implica-
tions. First, BITs should diffuse among host country competitors-
countries that, from an investor's point of view, are closely substitutable
venues for investment. It is precisely these countries that should display
the clearest evidence of interdependent decision making. This is a
unique prediction of competitive theory. No other diffusion mecha-
nism-whether hegemonic, cognitive, or ideational-makes this specific
prediction.
Second, BITs should spread most readily to countries where the
competition for capital is the most intense. Competition intensifies
where the number of plausible hosts for a particular investment project is
greatest. For this reason, host competition for investment in extractive
goods is far less intense than in light manufactures: while the number of
countries in which bauxite mining is profitable is quite limited, almost
any jurisdiction can host a Nike plant. If our competition hypothesis is
correct, these treaties should be more prevalent where host competition
is most fierce: in light manufactures rather than in primary production or
extractive industries. This prediction is the exact opposite of what one
might expect were BITs propelled in a "hegemonic" fashion, by the
home country. From a home government's point of view, theories of ob-
solescing bargaining should predict the need for enforceable investment
protections precisely in those industries that involve large, upfront, diffi-
cult-to-relocate investments. Obsolescing bargaining52 suggests that in-
vestors are more likely to demand treaties to protect their extractive and
primary production investments, at least relative to easier-to-relocate
light manufactures.53
Third, BITs should spread as the pool of available capital grows. As
the pool of global capital grows, any competitive advantage (such as that
conferred by a BIT) should yield a larger marginal increase in FDI in-
flows. Thus, the expected return per BIT should increase with the size of
the investment pool, which encourages hosts to scramble to improve ac-
51. Jamaica, a member of CARICOM when the guidelines were adopted, signed a string of BITs
with important partners in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the United Kingdom (1987); Swit-
zerland (1990); the Netherlands (1991); Germany (1992); France (1993); Italy (1993); United States
(1994); Argentina (1994); and China (1994). SICE: Countries: Jamaica: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/JAM/JAMBits.e.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). These BITs include
performance requirements and compensation provisions that are inconsistent with the CARICOM
guidelines.
52. See RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES 46-53 (1971); RAYMOND VERNON, STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS 150-51 (1977).
53. Kobrin finds that manufacturing is not characterized by the inherent, structurally based and
secular obsolescence that is found in the natural resource-based industries. Stephen J. Kobrin, Testing
the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries, 41 INT'L ORG. 609,
635 (1987).
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cess to a share of the bigger "pie." While other researchers have sug-
gested that BITs may contribute to a growth in FDI,54 our theory sug-
gests a possible feedback loop: the expectation of greater payoffs may
stimulate more treaties. This relationship is not predicted by more socio-
logical explanations, which might expect BITs to proliferate as a function
of the density of BITs themselves, rather than the growing volume of in-
vestment. Nor is it predicted by learning theories, which would pre-
sumably require a demonstration that BITs actually "work" in attracting
capital.
Finally, while all countries should, to some degree, be subject to the
competitive pressures we have theorized above, BITs should diffuse
somewhat more readily among host governments that lack credibility.
For these countries, a BIT can be expected to make a real difference to
investors, if other factors are held constant. In countries that already
have transparent and predictable institutions and practices that are fa-
vorable to investors, a costly BIT adds relatively little value. These states
may be able to compete for capital on the basis of their inherent credibil-
ity. If governments have been "socialized" to accept the dominant para-
digm for investor protection, there would be no reason for the more
credible host governments to largely exempt themselves.
A competitive theory of BITs predicts that the host countries most
likely to sign treaties will be those whose competitors have signed, those
who depend on manufacturing over extractive production, and those
with a credibility gap. More generally, a competitive theory predicts in-
creased treaties as the pool of available capital grows. In the following
section, we develop an empirical strategy for testing these hypotheses
against alternative explanations.
III. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND DATA
A. Analytical Design
We use an event history framework to estimate the duration of time
before two countries sign a BIT. Our analysis begins in 1958, the year
before the first BIT, and includes those BITs concluded up to January 1,
2000, the last year for which we have accurate data. Since the focus of
the analysis is a bilateral agreement between governments in a given
year, the appropriate unit of analysis is the country dyad-year. In each
dyad, we identify the potential "home" and the potential "host" country
based on their relative level of development, as measured by GDP per
capita. Of course, such designations become less meaningful the closer
the members of the dyad are in their level of development. But treaties
among countries of a similar level of development -especially at the
higher end-are considerably less likely. In the reported analysis we ex-
54. Neumayer & Spess, supra note 36, at 1568-83.
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clude "developed dyads" from the sample in order to minimize the bias
from estimates derived from "irrelevant dyads."" Otherwise our sample
includes all independent states, as identified by Gleditsch and Ward.56
Event history methods offer a convenient way to incorporate time
dependence in models of policy or innovation adoption. Our formula-
tion is slightly more complicated than most since the unit of analysis is
the country dyad and the model includes variables measured for one or
the other member of the dyad as well as for the dyad itself. We estimate
the following equation:
= +i,t + fZj,t " (5ijt + pWy,- +
where yij is the number of years without a BIT between countries i
(host) and j (home), X is a vector of conditions that affect country i's cal-
culations, Z is a vector of conditions that affect country j's calculations, V
is a vector of characteristics of the relationship between countries i and j,
and Wy* is a vector of spatial lag terms in which a count of BITs among
other host countries in the previous year (y*) is weighted by various
measures of their distance (W) to country i (see our discussion of spatial
lags below). We estimate this equation with a Cox proportional hazard
model, a useful estimator when one does not have strong assumptions
about the effect of time on the baseline hazard.
B. Data and Measures
Our dependent variable is the number of years a dyad goes without
a treaty, marked by the year of a treaty's signing, rather than the year in
which it enters into force." We reason that the signing not only ap-
proximates the moment during which a government deliberates over the
treaty, but is also the more important event for purposes of sending a
55. We exclude dyads in which both members are classified as "high income countries" by the
World Bank (that is, dyads in which both members have a GDP per capita of over $6,000-in 1987
U.S. dollars-in a given year), thus excluding 125 BITs in the analysis. For a current list of the World
Bank's Country Classifications, see The World Bank, Country Classification, http://go.worldbank.org/
K2CKM78CCO (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
56. Kristian S. Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of
the Independent States Since The Congress of Vienna, 25 INT'L INTERACTIONS 393, 405-10 (1999). Re-
stricting our sample to those states (and their dates of existence) identified by Gleditsch and Ward
means that we exclude eighteen BITs listed in the UNCTAD data, such as the fourteen to which Hong
Kong was party as well as those involving states such as the United Arab Emirates and Slovenia, which
occur several years prior to the dates that Gleditsch and Ward list the states as independent. The rela-
tively inclusive sample ensures that we will encounter missing data, particularly for smaller countries.
We experiment with several methods of managing missing data, none of which alter the substantive
findings. For the results below, we have estimated missing values of time-varying covariates with dec-
ade means where possible and appropriate. Such extrapolations buy a more inclusive sample at the
expense of potentially underestimated standard errors. See generally Gary King et al., Analyzing In-
complete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation, 95 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 49 (2001).
57. While approximately forty dyads have entered into second and, in one case, third treaties, we
predict the duration until the first treaty.
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proinvestment signal to international markets.58 Both UNCTAD and the
World Bank's ICSID track the date and signatories of BITs. 9 While the
two sources basically agree, UNCTAD's list is more recent and more
comprehensive.' As the equation above indicates, our independent
variables take on one of four analytic forms: (1) independent factors as-
sociated with the home country, (2) independent factors associated with
the host country, (3) factors associated with the relationship between
host and home countries, and (4) spatial lags of the dependent variable.
1. Spatial Lags of the Dependent Variable: Competition and Cultural
Emulation
To assess the source and strength of the various influences of policy
diffusion we construct a series of spatial lags.6" Spatial lag models treat
spatial dependence in the same way time-series models treat serial corre-
lation.62 Instead of (or, in our case, in addition to) lagging the value of
the dependent variable one unit in time, one "lags" it one (or more) units
in space to capture the behavior of neighbors. Thus, the general formu-
lation of the spatial lag above is Wy*, in which W is an N by N by T spa-
tial weights matrix that maps the distances between units for each year,
and y* is an N by T matrix of values that represent some function of the
dependent variable for all countries other than i. In our case, y* repre-
sents the sum total of BITs in force for each host country in a given
year.63 We then compute the weighted average of y* by dividing the sum
of its product with W, by a row sum of W. Thus, the spatial lag for coun-
try i using the weight w is as follows:
wity j + WikYk + .. + WinY n
Wii + Wik +... +Win
This computation of Wy* allows an intuitive interpretation of the
spatial lag: it is the average number of BITs in force among other host
58. "As the great majority of BITs are ratified, it is reasonable to assume that, in the perception
of investors, signing a BIT is the crucial action: Once a BIT is signed, or expected to be signed, the
market has absorbed it or begins to absorb it." UNCTAD, supra note 36, at 106.
59. UNCTAD, Country-specific Lists of BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?
intltemlD=2344&lang=l (last visited Aug. 25, 2007); The World Bank Group, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
60. Our comparison of the two data sets found that, for the years they overlapped (1959-1997),
UNCTAD included over two hundred treaties not included in the ICSID database. Compare
UNCTAD, supra note 59, with The World Bank Group, supra note 59.
61. These spatial lags are modeled largely after those in Beth A. Simmons & Zachary Elkins,
The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy, 98 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 171 (2004).
62. Luc ANSELIN, SPATIAL ECONOMETRICS: METHODS AND MODELS 22-23 (1988).
63. This formulation assumes that it is the accumulation of treaties among peers, not the "event"
of their recent signing, that provokes a response. We also experimented with an event trigger by cal-
culating the number of BITs signed by others in the previous year. In fact, the results were largely
comparable.
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countries, weighted by some distance to country i. Since the spatial lag is
endogenous, we lag it one year to capture the behavior of other host
countries in the previous year, a chronology that makes more sense for
the causal logic of diffusion as well.' Note that the W matrix can repre-
sent not only geographic distances, but also economic, cultural, or politi-
cal distances among countries.65
Our theory predicts interdependent decision making among host
countries that compete for the same sources of global capital. Thus, we
need to determine the "competitive distance" between hosts. We create
spatial weights that capture this distance in three ways. The first meas-
ures the degree to which host governments compete in the same foreign
markets; that is, it measures the extent to which they have the same ex-
port trade relationships.' (All data sources and descriptive statistics are
provided in the Data Appendix.) This is a useful indicator because trade
competitors are also likely to be competitors for FDI and because em-
pirical studies show that the two are strongly correlated. We reason that
countries that compete for export markets are structurally positioned to
compete for the same sources of FDI as well. The second measure re-
cords the degree to which nations export the same basket of goods.67
This measure captures the idea that investors choose between alternative
locations for direct investment that they consider close substitutes with
respect to the countries' traditional export products. For example, an
automobile manufacturer might consider investing in countries that pro-
64. While spatial lags are common solutions to estimating the relational effects that we hypothe-
size, they do introduce a potential degree of endogeneity. Unless nondiffusion predictors are included
in the model, spatial lags can absorb these effects when the domestic variables are correlated within
the network. For this reason, some scholars have moved towards simultaneous equation modeling, in
order to model the endogeneity. Recent monte-carlo evidence, reported in Robert J. Franzese, Jr. &
Jude C. Hays, Modeling International Diffusion: Inferential Benefits and Methodological Challenges,
with an Application to International Tax Competition (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Markets and Po-
litical Economy, Working Paper No. SP II 2004-12, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=560581,
suggests that the costs associated with such models may outweigh their benefits in large samples. Our
solution is to specify the nondiffusion components as completely as possible and to lag the spatial lag
one year. Nonetheless, we recognize that effects from spatial lags may be slightly inflated.
65. Nathaniel Beck et al., Space is More than Geography: Using Spatial Econometrics in the
Study of Political Economy, 50 INT'L STUD. Q. 27, 31-32 (2006); Simmons & Elkins, supra note 61, at
178.
66. We use the IMF Direction of Trade data to produce an N by N by T matrix of correlations
(between countries) across the countries' proportion of exports to each of the 182 partner countries.
Two countries that export goods in the same proportions to 182 countries will have a score of 1, while
those with entirely opposite relationships will have score of -1. For a similar approach, see Joseph M.
Finger & M. E. Kreinin, A Measure of 'Export Similarity' and Its Possible Uses, 89 ECON. J. 905 (1979).
Network analysts often use this sort of measure to identify competitors. See STANLEY WASSERMAN &
KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 376-77 (1994).
67. We calculate the distance between countries according to their export products, using infor-
mation from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), available at http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=l&queryid=135, that de-
scribes a country's export mix. These indicators tap the value of exports (in 1995 U.S. dollars) in sec-
tors such as food, fuel, agricultural raw materials, ores and metals, and arms. We calculate the correla-
tion between countries for each year across thirteen such indicators. The result is a measure, ranging
from -1 to 1, of the similarity between countries according to the products they export.
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duce steel but will be unlikely to consider those whose leading export is
cocoa. Our third measure captures the degree to which countries have
similar educational and infrastructure resources. Assuming that poten-
tial foreign direct investors are concerned with a country's human assets
as well as its technological and communications infrastructure, we reason
that countries with similar educational and infrastructural profiles will
compete for the same pool of capital.' For all three competition meas-
ures, we compute a spatial lag by anchoring the distances (measured as
correlations) at zero, adding 1 to each score, and then using these dis-
tances to calculate a weighted sum of BITs in force in all other host coun-
tries in the previous year.
FIGURE 6
A MEASURE OF EXPORT MARKET SIMILARITY, THE BRAZILIAN CASE
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The competition distances themselves appear to have a fair degree
of validity. For example, Figure 6 plots the values for the "distance" in
export products between Brazil and select countries across time. If these
values are to be believed, Brazil's products correlated quite highly with
those of most Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s. This cor-
relation decreased in the 1990s, at which time Brazil's export profile be-
gan to resemble that of the United States and Canada more than that of
its Latin American neighbors. This finding is consistent with the com-
mon interpretation of the increasingly diversified Brazilian economy,
68. We compare such investment profiles by calculating correlations, by year, between countries
across roughly fifteen educational and infrastructural variables selected from the WDI. These dis-
tances range from -1 to 1.
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whose exports in everything from technology to agriculture now compete
directly with the United States and less directly with smaller Latin
American states.69
We also use spatial lags in a similar way to measure the influence of
an important alternative explanation: the influence of cultural peers.7"
We use three measures of "cultural distance": predominant religion, co-
lonial heritage, and predominant language. The spatial lag for these
"distances" is calculated in the same weighted-average manner as for the
competitive distances. Unlike the competition measures, the cultural dis-
tances are binary: a country either shares a common language with an-
other, or it does not. The cultural spatial lags, therefore, are equivalent
to the mean number of BITs in force among those host countries with
the same cultural identity (religion, language, or colonial heritage).
These measures capture the important possibility that BITs result more
from socially constructed emulation of policies of important reference
groups than from hard-nosed economic competition. Note that this
measure does not capture whether BITs are more likely between cultural
peers, an effect we test below with the cultural distance variables them-
selves.
2. Alternative Diffusion Mechanisms: Learning and Coercion
Finally, we seek to capture the effects of policy learning and coer-
cion. Our notion of learning implies that policymakers from host coun-
tries are motivated to sign BITs based on the treaties' demonstrated
benefits (specifically, increased FDI).7" Our model does not assume poli-
cymakers have Herculean powers of observation or analysis; nor does it
treat them as remedial statisticians. We assume simply that policymakers
assess the success of countries in attracting investment over recent years
given the countries' level of development and their number of treaties in
force during this time. We replicate this cognitive process by regressing,
each year, the average FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP for the pre-
vious five years on the average number of treaties in force for that coun-
try during that period as well as its average GDP per capita. The stan-
dardized regression coefficient for the BITs variable in each of these
yearly equations is our indicator of a policy maker's estimate of the pay-
off of these treaties in terms of increased investment.72 Thus, we assume
that each year, decision makers observe and draw conclusions about the
69. See WERNER BAER, THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 228-30 (5th
ed. 2001).
70. Simmons et al., supra note 32, at 789.
71. Id. at 802.
72. In order to compute these results, we use only those data that are immediately available to us
(and, more to the point, to policymakers). We reason that our informational constraints should match
those of policymakers. As such, we use data reported in the World Bank's WDI, see supra note 67,
and do not make efforts to impute or otherwise fill in missing data in these equations.
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effects of BITs on investment, controlling for a country's level of devel-
opment, and that all actors observe the same signal.
Because FDI data from the 1960s is sparse, the effect of the treaties
is incalculable with any degree of certainty, both for us and for policy-
makers at the time. Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s, the ap-
parent effect of BITs is effectively zero or even negative. However, by
the early 1990s-the period in which more than half of existing BITs
were signed-BITs appear to have obvious payoffs. Those countries
with BITs in force in those years are clearly also the recipients of invest-
ment.73 The coefficient in 1990, for example, suggests that each BIT in
force is associated with an extra .05% of GDP in investment. Thus, a
country with fifty BITs (for example, Chile) has almost 2.5% more of its
GDP (more than $1 billion in Chile) in investment than a country with-
out a BIT. This is the difference between having no foreign direct in-
vestment and having the worldwide average for a low- or middle-income
country, for which gross FDI averages around 2.3% of GDP. To an ob-
servant host country in 1990, BITs would certainly appear to have some
demonstrable benefits.
We consider one final interdependent mechanism: coercion. It may
be that potential hosts are coerced or at least strongly encouraged to en-
ter into BITs. If so, a likely juncture for the application of such pressure
is at the time a country seeks International Monetary Fund (IMF) cred-
its. We incorporate a dichotomous measure of whether or not a country
has drawn on IMF resources in a given year. Though we do not believe
the pursuit of or entry into BITs is explicitly stipulated in formal loan
conditions, there may be more subtle pressures on a state in balance-of-
payments difficulties to use these treaties to attract foreign capital.
3. Home Country Considerations
The proliferation of BITs could be explained by two home country
considerations: the desire to protect existing overseas capital, and the de-
sire for additional investments. These considerations could significantly
influence the pool of BITs that is potentially available, independently of
any competitive dynamic among potential hosts. In the analysis that fol-
lows, we control for the total FDI "exposure" of the home country; that
is, we control for the degree to which a country's capital is actually in-
vested abroad. For this we use a measure of net FDI outflows as a pro-
portion of GDP (scored positively when outflows outweigh inflows and
negatively when inflows outweigh outflows). On average, we expect high
outflows to produce a greater willingness to supply BITs on the part of
investors' governments.
73. Such mixed results do not seem surprising given the discrepant findings of scholars on this
question. See supra note 36.
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In models not reported here, we also include country dummies for
the identity of home governments with the most active BIT programs
(Germany, Switzerland, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the
United States) in order to absorb any idiosyncratic tendencies to pursue
BITs and to capture the effect of large BIT programs.
4. Host Country Considerations
Our competitive story of the proliferation of BITs suggests that
competitive reputation building, through BITs, can set off a sequence of
treaty signings among countries that compete with one another. Al-
though all countries may be subject to such competitive pressures to
some degree, we expect governments with greater indigenous credibility
to be less willing to pay the sovereignty and other political costs associ-
ated with concluding BITs. We capture this idea by using an indicator of
investors' perceptions of corruption in the host country. The more cor-
rupt a state is perceived to be, the more necessary it becomes to lure in-
vestors with an explicit promise to delegate adjudication to an authorita-
tive third party. We complement this measure with one of the nature of
the legal system itself. The research of some scholars suggests that com-
mon law systems tend to provide better property rights protections.74
These scholars argue that civil law systems are more likely to implement
regulatory solutions to perceived social conflict75 - arguably, the kind of
approach likely to make external capital flinch. If civil law systems are
less oriented toward credible rules of capital protection, governments in
those systems should more frequently reach for an external commitment
mechanism, such as a BIT.76 Finally, we would like to use a measure of
the extent to which the host's legal system is perceived by foreign inves-
tors as strong and impartial. Unfortunately, the measure that appears to
be most appropriate for tapping legal strength and impartiality ("law and
order") is confounded by the inclusion of investors' assessment of popu-
lar observance of the law, which likely has little to do with the judiciary's
attitude toward foreign investors. Nonetheless, our argument implies
that a reputation for "law and order" should reduce a host's need to sign
a BIT.
Another important factor, and one with implications for our compe-
tition story, has to do with a country's exposure to competition. If BITs
are driven by competition for capital, they should be most prevalent
74. See generally Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 3 J. FIN. 1131
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., External Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J.
POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance].
75. Juan Botero et al., The Regulation of Labor (2002), http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workshops/
papers/History/flopslabor.3.pdf.
76. We use an indicator of an English Common law tradition generated by the World Bank and
used by La Porta et al. See William R. Easterly, Global Development Network Growth Database
(2001), http://go.worldbank.org/ZSQKYF6J0 (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
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where that competition is most fierce. We have argued that competition
for capital is most cutthroat in manufacturing; by comparison, there are
limited sites worldwide that produce copper or other extractive com-
modities. The fewer the alternative investment sites, the more protected
the host from international competition, and the less likely a host is to
sign a BIT. To capture this idea, we construct a measure of extractive
industry dependence by summing the share of each country's exports of
both fuel and "ores and metals," as recorded in the World Bank's World
Development Indicators (WDI). Approaches emphasizing the coercive
role of dominant powers would anticipate a positive coefficient for ex-
tractive industries, since these are most subject to obsolescing bargaining
and hence intensified political risks. Our expectation, however, is that
this effect will be swamped by competition among hosts for manufactur-
ing FDI, and we anticipate a negative effect. The outcome on the extrac-
tive industry variable thus provides a fairly crisp test of the importance of
competition among hosts in explaining the proliferation of BITs.
Quite aside from indicators of the need for a credible commitment
discussed above, a number of economic conditions make particular hosts
especially attractive BIT partners. We control for the economic desir-
ability of the investment site by controlling for market size of the host
country (log of the host's GDP),77 the host's level of development (GDP
per capita),78 the quality of the host's workforce (rate of illiteracy), and
the host's growth (GDP growth rate).79 We also include a rather direct
measure of the host's attractiveness for capital, FDI net inflows in the
previous year, as a percentage of GDP.8"
Finally, we control for other political and policy conditions in the
host country. Since investors may see democracies as less capricious, we
control for the host's level of democracy. It is possible that the pattern of
BITs is driven by a few countries' aggressive privatization programs, so
we control for the value of privatized assets in a given year. Finally, we
recognize that to sign BITs requires a certain degree of diplomatic capac-
ity. We account for the diplomatic and legal capacity to enter into BITs
by controlling for the total number of embassies a country hosts and has
established in foreign countries. 81 A host with extensive diplomatic rep-
77. Stephen J. Kobrin, The Environmental Determinants of Foreign Direct Manufacturing In-
vestment: An Ex Post Empirical Analysis, 7 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 29, 32-37 (1976); David Wheeler &
Ashoka Mody, International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms, 33 J. INT'L ECON.
57, 63-67 (1992).
78. Henisz, supra note 5, at 351.
79. See Kobrin, supra note 77, at 32-37; La Porta et al., External Finance, supra note 74, at 1139.
80. The literature on agglomeration economies, stressing the increasing benefits of collocation
by economic units, provides a justification for including prior FDI inflows. See Wheeler & Mody, su-
pra note 77, at 58. As current and future FDI is likely affected by the very agreements we predict in
this model, we lag the measure one year.
81. See Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The
Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 557, 575 (2005).
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resentation is more likely to have the international political and legal ca-
pacity to conclude a larger volume of treaties.
5. Characteristics of Country Pairs
In this analytic category we identify the relational variables that
might be associated with the likelihood of an agreement between the two
nations. We focus on three kinds of relationships: business, security, and
cultural relationships. Since firms are likely to want to invest in or near
their export markets and to otherwise take advantage of vertical down-
stream linkages,82 we control for the intensity of business transactions,
proxied by the extent of trade between the two countries. Investment
agreements may also have a foreign policy83 or even a security rationale
as well. To address this possibility, we include a measure of the intensity
of the alliance relationship for each pair. We also consider the possibility
that BITs reflect cultural relationships, although this variable could have
opposing effects. On the one hand, it may be easier for states with cul-
tural similarities to negotiate successfully. On the other hand, if cultural
similarities also reduce the perceived risks of investment, a common cul-
ture might operate in the opposite direction, reducing the need for a BIT.
We test the relationship between cultural characteristics and BIT signing
by coding country pairs with shared language and colonial traditions.
Note that these variables should not be confused with the cultural spatial
lags, which are measures of a host's peers' treaty activity.
IV. FINDINGS
Table 2 presents estimates (as hazard ratios) from three specifica-
tions of our model. A hazard ratio of more than 1 represents a positive
effect on the odds of a BIT; less than 1, a negative effect. The first re-
gression includes the export-partner lag together with the full set of co-
variates described above. The last two regressions include one of the
remaining two competitive spatial lags (export product similarity and in-
frastructure/workforce similarity) in a reduced form of the model. Sev-
82. The literature that has focused on firm and industry level explanations for the location of
FDI emphasizes that firms that depend on foreign sales are more likely to invest overseas. For exam-
ple, some research suggests that a firm's decisions to deepen its presence in a particular country is in-
fluenced by the extent of its prior experience in that jurisdiction. See Clifford A. Ball & Adrian E.
Tschoegl, The Decision to Establish a Foreign Bank Branch or Subsidiary: An Application of Binary
Classification Procedures, 17 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 411, 420 (1982). Others have found
that firms are more likely to invest where they have strategic advantages, and that these are plausible
when connected with vertical downstream linkages. See Yui Kimura, Firm-Specific Strategic Advan-
tages and Foreign Direct Investment Behavior of Firms: The Case of Japanese Semiconductor Firms, 20
J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 296, 304-05 (1989). The measure proposed here assumed that these effects may
show up in the aggregate trade relationships at the national level.
83. See JOANNE S. GOWA, ALLIES, ADVERSARIES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 31-53 (1994);
Brian M. Pollins, Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interac-
tions on Bilateral Trade Flows, 33 AM. J. POL. SC. 737, 737-38 (1989).
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eral clear empirical patterns begin to emerge. There is fairly consistent
and convincing evidence of the importance of competition for capital
among developing countries in explaining the proliferation of BITs over
the past four decades. In all cases, higher rates of BIT signing among
competitors (however measured) appear to have increased the rate at
which a given country itself enters into a BIT at statistically significant
levels. One can appreciate the size of these effects in Figure 7a, which
plots the survival curve for two different values of the spatial lag calcu-
lated from the "export product similarity" measure, the competition
variable with the largest impact. In this illustration, a country whose
competitors average fifteen agreements has a markedly increased risk of
signing an agreement compared with a country whose competitors have
refrained from signing. In the late 1990s (forty years after the inception
of BITs), the difference between such countries in their probability of
signing is almost 0.20. The results of these three competition variables
alone provide preliminary evidence that competition is central to the
spread of BITs.
FIGURE 7A
SURVIVAL ESTIMATES ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF
BITS OF HOST'S COMPETITORS (MEASURED BY EXPORT PRODUCT
SIMILARITY)
competitors' BITs 0
43
0
2competitors' BITs =15 L _
0 10 20 30 40
Years under analysis
Note: Estimates derived from Model 2 in Table 2.
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TABLE 2
A MODEL OF BIT SIGNINGS: COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARD MODEL
Explanatory variables Model I Model 2 Model 3
Competitive theory
BITS AMONG EXPORT 1.05**
MARKET COMPETITORS (0.01)
BITS AMONG EXPORT 1.11**
PRODUCT COMPETITORS (0.04)
BITs AMONG 1.04**
INFRASTRUCTURE (0.02)
COMPETITORS
AVERAGE ANNUAL 1.32*** 1.53*** 1.46***
GLOBAL FDI FLOWS (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
HOST EXTRACTIVE 0.73** 0.73** 0.72***
INDUSTRIES/EXPORTS (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
PERCEPTIONS OF HOST 1.03 1.01 1.01
CORRUPTION (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HOST LEGAL TRADITION 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.66***
(COMMON LAW) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Alternative diffusion explanations
BITs AMONG THOSE WITH 0.99 0.98 0.99
SAME RELIGION (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
BITs AMONG THOSE WITH 1.01
SAME LANGUAGE (0.06)
BITs AMONG THOSE WITH 0.99
SAME COLONIZER (0.04)
LEARNING FROM SUCCESS 1.85** 1.83* 2.13*
(0.42) (0.61) (0.94)
COERCION: HOST USE OF 1.44*** 1.39*** 1.43***
IMF CREDITS (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Host control variables
HOST GDP (LN) 1.07* 1.03 1.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
HOST GDP/CAPITA 1.00 1.00 0.99
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
HOST GDP GROWTH 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HOST NET FDI INFLOWS (% 1.01 1.01 1.01
OF GDP), T-1 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HOST ILLITERACY RATE 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
HOST CAPITAL 1.01 1.01** 1.01"*
ACCOUNT/GDP (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HOST LAW AND ORDER 1.34*** 1.39*** 1.38***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
HOST DEMOCRACY 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
HOST DIPLOMATIC 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01"**
REPRESENTATION (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HOST PRIVATIZATION 1.05"** 1.06*** 1.06***
RECORD (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Home control variables
HOME NET FDI OUTFLOWS 1.13*** 1.14*** 1.14***
(% OF GDP) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dyadic control variables
DYADIC TRADE (% OF 1.59* 1.61 1.64
HOST'S GDP) (0.35) (0.56) (0.57)
(Continued on next page)
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TABLE 2- Continued
Explanatory variables Model I Model 2 Model 3
COMMON COLONIAL 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41***
HERITAGE (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
COMMON LANGUAGE 1.57*** 1.55"** 1.54***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
ALLIANCE 1.18* 1.20* 1.18
(0.10) (0.11) (0.14)
Common "shocks"
COLD WAR 0.37*** 0.31*** 0.32***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06)
NUMBER OF BITs 1.03 1.00 1.01
GLOBALLY, BY YEAR (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 206766 208610 201073
Number of country-pairs analyzed 6781 6831 6828
Number of BITs 1125 1140 1137
Log likelihood -8723.114 -8858.474 -8823.590
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The evidence also suggests that as global FDI has increased, poten-
tial hosts have been more willing to sign BITs. One interpretation of this
finding is that as the pool of FDI has increased, the competitive stakes
for a share have grown. The pattern with respect to countries with pre-
dominantly extractive industries also provides corroboratory evidence
for the competition theory. The results show that higher extractive pro-
duction by the potential host reduces the propensity to negotiate a BIT
(contrary to expectations based on investors' demands to address obso-
lescing bargains endemic to primary and extractive production). Figure
7b, which compares the signing rates for a government with a largely ex-
tractive-based economy versus one with an exclusively manufacturing-
based economy, suggests that-ceteris paribus-signing rates can differ
by as much as ten percentage points depending on a state's level of ex-
tractive material exports. Both the magnitude and stability of this effect
across models suggests that it is a fairly robust finding.
We found inconsistent evidence, however, to support our expecta-
tion that host countries with a credibility gap are most likely to sign a
BIT. Contrary to expectation, BITs were more likely to be signed by
countries with better reputations for "law and order." We have already
noted that this indicator only partially reflects our argument, as it con-
flates perceptions of the strength of the court system with perceptions of
popular willingness to obey the law. Even so, the strong positive result is
surprising. One possibility is that this measure is picking up the rela-
tively favorable orientation of some countries toward legal solutions to
conflicts generally. As we expected, perceptions of corruption were in
the correct direction, although the hazard ratio is not statistically signifi-
cant in any specification that also contains "law and order." We should
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note that corruption is a significant determinant of signing a BIT when-
ever the law and order variable is not included. The common law vari-
able did work as anticipated, but in light of the above findings, we think
the prudent conclusion is that common law countries also refrain from
entering into these agreements for reasons other than the reputational
concerns developed here.
FIGURE 7B
SURVIVAL ESTIMATES ACCORDING TO HOST'S PERCENTAGE OF
EXPORTS IN EXTRACTING INDUSTRIES
[.. ''--' -- % of exports =50
"0 % of exports 0
2
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Years under analysis
Note: Estimates derived from Model 2 in Table 2.
In addition to the competition variables, our coercion variable (use
of IMF credits) is significant in each of the models. This may mean that
states seeking assistance from the IMF are encouraged to enter into
BITs. Alternatively, it may be that the conditionality of IMF loans over-
laps with the obligations of the BIT, reducing the costs of the latter. In-
terestingly, there is some evidence of learning from BIT outcomes. BITs
are significantly more likely to be signed during years in which signatory
states appear to be benefiting (in terms of FDI) from the treaties than
when they are not. Such a pattern, of course, is consistent with our gen-
eral theory of competition over shares of FDI. We found no evidence,
however, that countries sign agreements in response to signings in their
cultural networks. None of the spatial lags along religion, language or
colonial heritage had consequential effects.
Many of the variables that targeted home country interest in offer-
ing a BIT to a developing country had somewhat unpredictable, and
muted, effects. The size of the host economy and previous FDI inflows
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(as a percentage of host GDP) showed effects in the predicted direction,
although rarely statistically significant across the models we tested.
Meanwhile, GDP per capita and economic growth had, if anything, the
opposite effects of what we would expect, although only the economic
growth coefficients were significant. On the other hand, we did find evi-
dence that countries with a high quality workforce (as measured by liter-
acy rates) and with an export orientation (current accounts tending to-
ward surplus) were more likely to sign BITs. In other words, illiteracy is
associated with a reduced likelihood of a BIT. Our prediction that priva-
tization programs in a host country would coincide with BIT agreements
was borne out as well. Similarly, host countries with a larger diplomatic
presence were also more likely to enter into BITs. Finally, hosts' degree
of democracy had practically no effect.
Certain control variables describing the relationships between home
and host countries were important predictors of BITs. While the direc-
tion of dyadic trade is as hypothesized, the effect is statistically insignifi-
cant in two of three models. Political and cultural relationships seem to
be more important. In accordance with expectations, BITs are more
likely among allies, which could suggest a somewhat coercive element to
their conclusion. A common language within the dyad makes it much
more likely a pair of countries will negotiate a BIT, but a colonial link
reduces by about two-thirds the likelihood that a country pair will do so.
Perhaps investors in home countries perceive the risk in their colonial
"families" to be lower than in other states. After all, colonies' legal insti-
tutions are likely to be similar to, if not partially overlapping with, legal
institutions in the mother country and fellow former colonies. This fits
with our conception of BITs as being created to establish a credible legal
framework for investment that is otherwise lacking.
In models not reported here, we attempted also to control for the
BIT "programs" of particularly active countries by including country
dummy variables for the five most active hosts and the five most active
home countries. All were highly significant, with the partial exceptions
of Germany and the United States. Their inclusion reduced substantially
the effect of two variables, the volume of bilateral trade between country
pairs and the home country net foreign direct investment. The robust-
ness of the other results to the country dummies, however, reassures us
that our results are not driven by idiosyncratic policies in a few of the
most active countries.
Finally, we consider the potential impact of commonly experienced
"shocks" on the propensity to sign BITs. All countries could have been
affected by the cold war, and our results indicate a significantly lower
propensity to sign BITs during that era. Our more general measure of
BIT period effects (the number of BITs signed in a given year), however,
is insignificant in the company of our fairly comprehensive model. What-
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ever temporal clusters were evident in Figure 1 are accounted for by pre-
dictors in our model.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of bilateral investment treaties has grown significantly since
the early 1960s. Their growth is especially remarkable given the outright
rebellion many hosts have staged against understandings of customary
law and multilateral codifications of investors' rights that are quite simi-
lar to those contained in these proliferating bilateral accords. Why the
disjuncture? How can we understand the spread of these promarket
agreements across time and space?
Both theoretically and empirically, a competition model seems most
apt in this case. These treaties are meant to improve conditions under
which global capital relocates, prospers, and repatriates. They are also
meant to raise the reputational stakes for governments of capital-poor
economies by committing them to respect property and contractual rights
of foreign investors and to agree to arbitration-effectively clipping their
sovereignty-in the event of any disagreement over subsequent invest-
ment contracts. There are clearly possibilities here for mutual gain for
hosts and investors, though we are agnostic about the global welfare ef-
fects of these treaties, given their potential redistributive consequences.
We admit that some of the more recent treaties between very poor coun-
tries do not square with our straightforward competitive model; nonethe-
less, the strongest case can be made for a competitive diffusion dynamic
in this case.
There was certainly plenty of support in the data for traditional
economic explanations for BIT signings. Some of the most important
drivers of the spread of BITs are likely factors that drive investment de-
cisions more generally. The pattern of BITs shows that home govern-
ments want to secure investments in developing markets that are large
and somewhat open, with high quality labor. On the other hand, BITs
are most valuable where political risk is endemic. China, which has con-
cluded a large number of BITs with both rich and poor partners, would
be the quintessential BIT partner, according to our model.
We also found strong evidence that dyadic characteristics explain
BITs. BITs are much more likely to be negotiated among country pairs
of the same culture (at least as measured by shared language) and among
country pairs with strong security commitments. But if cultural linkages
explain home-host pairs, cultural emulation is much less in evidence
among potential hosts. Not one indicator of cultural emulation among
hosts had any purchase at all on the adoption of BITs. These cultural ar-
guments may in the end be a more satisfying account available for the
growing category of "strange BITs" between highly indebted, capital-
poor, noncontiguous country pairs. We know anecdotally that third par-
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ties (i.e., France and UNCTAD) facilitated many of these agreements,
indicating that in many cases external political or cultural forces may be
crucial. The strong positive effect of IMF borrowing and alliance rela-
tionships on the propensity to sign a BIT also reminds us that a certain
degree of coercion may be at play in some cases.
We do not doubt that multiple motives exist for the spread of this
form of protection for foreign investors. But the competitive explanation
has strong theoretical foundations and is the most consistently supported
by the data. First, it was well supported by three different measures of
"competitive space": by export market, by export product, and by work-
force/infrastructural quality. When more of a host's closest competitors
have signed BITs, that country is much more likely do so itself. The re-
markable consistency across these three highly nuanced measures of
competitive space provide strong initial evidence of a tendency to match
the policy choices of competitors.
Second, the size and character of markets for foreign direct invest-
ment have fed the competitive atmosphere in predictable ways. The
sheer size of the available pool of investment has greatly raised coun-
tries' stakes in securing a share. More BITs are signed when the global
capital pool increases. This finding is of course consistent with home
countries' concerns to protect their investors as well as hosts' desires to
increase their access. But a second finding much more clearly indicates
that the impetus for signing is host-country driven. Our theory of com-
petition among hosts predicts more BITs where the market for FDI is
most competitive-the manufacturing sector. We found, in contrast to
what theories of obsolescing bargaining would predict, that dependence
on extractive industries reduced the probability that a host would make
such a commitment.
Finally, a theory of host-driven competition was supported by some
of our findings about the qualities associated with those hosts most likely
to sign. We expected BITs to be pursued most assiduously by host gov-
ernments whose domestic institutions render them least able to make
credible commitments to protect property rights. When we excluded the
possibly confounded "law and order" variable from our analysis, hosts
were much more likely to sign if their regime was perceived as corrupt by
foreign investors. They were also more likely to sign depending on the
nature of their legal institutions. Common law countries-legal systems
that well-documented empirical work has shown to be associated with
better legal protection for property rights' - are much less likely to sign
than are civil law countries. We recognize that there are other reasons
for common law countries to be reluctant to enter into international
treaty obligations generally, but it remains possible that the differential
ability of various legal traditions to indigenously protect property rights
84. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 74, at 1115-16.
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is at work as well. In this context, our finding on "law and order" is
somewhat puzzling. But we are far less convinced that this indicator cap-
tures the domestic institutional guarantees of protection and fairness that
foreign direct investors seek.
The diffusion of norms that protect investment has been further ad-
vanced by host governments' desire to attract a share of the global capi-
tal pool. We have doubts that this phenomenon can be explained by the
appeal of liberal ideas alone, for we have witnessed the proliferation of
BITs just as multilateral and customary law approaches have foundered.
Most governments would prefer to avoid the explicit commitments con-
tained in these treaties; there continue to be few concluded between the
wealthiest countries of the world. In some regions, developing countries
have tried to coordinate their responses to BITs in hopes of gaining more
favorable terms, with notably limited success. In short, we base our con-
clusions on the importance of competition for capital not just on statisti-
cal relationships that show up in the quantitative analysis, but also on the
broader context in which our analysis is nested.
BITs are part of a larger process of globalization that has been fur-
thered by the dynamics of competition. This competition is driven by the
desire of developing countries to participate in the global capitalist sys-
tem. But has this uncoordinated strategy of signing away the sovereign
right to regulate a growing segment of national economic activity yielded
the results developing countries have hoped for? The evidence whether
BITs actually succeed in attracting capital is unclear on this point. Our
research suggests why this may be the case. Competition for capital has
important redistributive consequences. The result of the BIT competi-
tion may be only minimally improved access to capital at a high cost to
national sovereignty.
POSTSCRIPT, 2000-2006
The research described above was based on an exhaustive dataset of
all BITs signed between 1959 and 1999. Recently we have collected data
on bilateral investments treaties for seven more years (2000-2006). We
have found 680 new BITs signed in these years-not an insignificant
number, but a decline in the rate of new signings compared to the boom
years of the 1990s. In 2001 there were 181 new BITs, but the number
falls to 128 in 2002; ninety in 2003; seventy-five in 2004; sixty-eight in
2005; and eight in 2006."5 Five countries who had never previously signed
a BIT signed at least one during this time period. Yemen led the small
pack of new BITs signers with fifteen new treaties between 2000 and
2006. Today, the only countries that have not signed at least one BIT are
85. The data for 2000-2006 comes also comes from UNCTAD, which can be found at
UNCTAD, Country-specific Lists of BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=
2344&lang=l (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
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city states (such as Monaco and Liechtenstein) or island microstates
(such as St. Kitts & Nevis and Kiribati). Certainly, it seems as though the
pool of desirable BIT partners is becoming nearly saturated; apparently
countries that would benefit economically from a BIT have for the most
part signed them.
A number of countries were especially active in the time period out-
side that of our main study. China led the way in BIT signings, reflecting
not only its position as an economically desirable venue to invest but also
its relatively new role as global foreign investor. Between 2000 and 2006,
China signed thirty-three new BITs-more than any other country.
Among non-OECD countries,86 Iran was second with twenty-seven new
BITs and the post-Yugoslavian states were third with between twenty-
three and twenty-six each. India was also an important late comer, with
twenty-one new BITs in these years. By contrast, the United States
signed only two additional BITs during these years, with Serbia and with
Uruguay.
Newer BITs reflect the integration of significant economies with the
rest of the world (China, India, Iran), activity of relatively new states (the
post-communist states), and some BITs signed by rather strange bedfel-
lows. That is, there continues to be a growing number of BITs that do
not seem to exhibit a clear economic logic, at least on their face. The
newer BITs do involve a significant number of "traditional" devel-
oped/developing country pairs, but there are also a conspicuous number
of agreements between relatively poor noncontiguous pairs, such as
Burkina Faso and Chad (2001), Romania and Mauritius (2000), and
Cuba and Zambia (2000).
To what extent should these new BITs cause us to rethink the com-
petitive theory we have described here? Many of these arrangements are
likely the tail end of the process of vying for capital among similarly situ-
ated countries. But a growing number of agreements seem to have been
negotiated among lower-income countries. To a significant extent, these
agreements represent saturation of the market for highly mutually bene-
ficial agreements. But why should governments negotiate treaties that
are unlikely to yield significant results, at least in the foreseeable future?
As we discussed above, many of these agreements resulted from negotia-
tions "sponsored" by third parties, such as UNCTAD or a major Euro-
pean economic power. But there are other possibilities as well. One is
that governments with very long time horizons are willing to negotiate
deals now, anticipating payoffs in the distant future. Another possibility
is that countries that may not make very attractive partners turn to one
another in an attempt to signal their "availability" to the global FDI
market. Such signals may be too weak to have their intended effect, but
less attractive investment venues may have few alternatives.
86. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Member Countries, http://www.
oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en 33873108_33844430 _1_1_1lj,00.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
[Vol. 2008
COMPETING FOR CAPITAL
Another possibility is that some of these BITs are not as strange as
they may seem in the aggregate. Even if the two countries in question do
not invest much directly in one another, it is quite possible that a com-
mon business interest invests in both, and wants to improve the flexibility
to move assets easily between them. Particular business networks might
account for some of the recent BITs signings between countries that do
not trade much with one another directly.
There may be noneconomic reasons for many of these newer BITs
as well. A significant number are negotiated within region. As such,
some may be more political than economic-a low-cost way to develop
positive political relationships and interactions, in the hope that these
might eventually spill over into broader cooperative relationships. Some
BITs might be efforts at local confidence building. There may be less ra-
tional, more symbolic reasons to negotiate BITs as well. The burst of ac-
tivity we have documented for the late 1980s and 1990s may have ele-
vated BITs as a symbol of modern statehood, as emphasized by some
sociological theories.87
We believe that the basic competitive dynamic we have described
here remains intact. There are individual BITs that are puzzling from a
competitive point of view, but these are largely idiosyncratic and are not
persuasively accounted for by an alternative model. Perhaps the most
leverage on the question of recent BITs would be gained by a thorough
understanding of these treaties in Chinese foreign economic strategy. As
China has emerged as a major foreign investor, they have assumed a pat-
tern of obligations (in Africa, for instance) that closely resembles the
treaty portfolio of the advanced industrialized countries of Europe.
Whether this potential economic giant's BITs strategy should be under-
stood as competitive or emulative is a question that will have to be an-
swered in another paper.
87. For a general discussion on how world culture effects the policies of individual states, see
John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. Soc. 144-81 (1997).
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DATA APPENDIX: SUMMARY STATISTICS AND SOURCES FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED
IN THE ANALYSIS
Variables
Dependent BILATERAL
variable INVESTMENT
TREATY
(SURVIVAL RATE)*
Mean , Standard Minimum Maximum Data
deviation Sources
0.97 0.17 0 1 (1)
Explanatory
variables
Competition BITS AMONG 2.79 3.72
EXPORT MARKET
COMPETITORS
BITS AMONG 3.70 4.12
EXPORT PRODUCT
COMPETITORS
BITS AMONG 3.41 3.84
INFRASTRUCTURE
COMPETITORS
AVERAGE ANNUAL 1.26 1.28
NET FEDI NFLOWS
(% OF GDP)
HOST EXTRACTIVE 0.23 0.28
INDUSTRIES/EXPOR
TS
PERCEPTIONS OF 3.27 1.23
HOST CORRUPTION
HOST LEGAL 0.32 0.47
TRADITION
(COMMON LAW)
Other diffu- BITS AMONG THOSE 2.82 3.50
sion WITH SAME
mechanisms RELIGION
BITS AMONG THOSE 3.12 3.54
WITH SAME
LANGUAGE
BITS AMONG THOSE 2.59 3.59
WITH SAME
COLONIZER
LEARNING FROM -0.15 0.22
SUCCESS
COERCION: HOST 0.74 0.41
USE OF IMF
CREDITS
Host coun- HOST GDP (LN) 22.25 2.08
try controls
HOST GDP/CAPITA 2.21 4.70
HOST GDP GROWTH 3.89 5.54
HOST NET FDI 1.32 3.95
INFLOWS (% OF
GDP), T-1
HOST ILLITERACY 0.40 0.28
RATE
HOST CAPITAL -4.74 8.54
ACCOUNT/GDP
0.00 36.57 (1), (2)
0.00 19.20 (1), (3)
0.03 18.21 (1), (3)
-1.17 3.90 (3)
0.00 1.00 (3)
0.00 6.00 (4)
0.00 1.00 (5)
0.00 32.00 (1), (7),
(8), (9)
0.00 43.25 (1), (7),
(8), (9)
0.00 56.39 (1), (7),
(8), (9)
-0.59 0.17 (1), (3)
0.00 1.00 (3)
17.24 29.79 (3)
0.00 52.71 (3)
-61.59 85.90 (3)
0.00 145.13 (3)
0.00 1.00 (3)
-120.60 65.30 (3)
(Continued on next page)
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DATA APPENDIX- Continued
Variables Mean Standard Minimum Maximum Data
deviation Sources
HOST LAW AND 2.24 1.41 0.00 6.00 (4)
ORDER
HOST DEMOCRACY -1.71 6.85 -10.00 10.00 (10)
HOST DIPLOMATIC 38.08 32.25 0.00 158.00 (11)
REPRESENTATION
HOST 0.18 0.80 0.00 14.80 (12)
PRIVATIZATION
RECORD
Home HOME NET FDI 0.31 1.60 -26.06 14.65 (3)
country OUTFLOWS (% OF
controls GDP)
Dyadic con- DYADIC TRADE (% 0.01 0.07 0.00 6.68 (2), (3)
trols OF HOST'S GDP)
COMMON 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 (7), (8),
COLONIAL (9)
HERITAGE
COMMON 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 (7), (8),
LANGUAGE (9)
ALLIANCE 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 (13)
Common COLD WAR 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 ---
"shocks"
NUMBER OF BITS 4.47 5.14 0.00 17.72 (1)
GLOBALLY, BY
YEAR
Notes: *Summary statistics for the dependent variable expressed as aver-
age survival rates (rate of not signing a BIT).
Data Sources:
(1) UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999 (2000),
available at http:/ www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf;
(2) IMF, DIRECTION OF TRADE STATISTICS, YEARBOOK;
(3) WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS;
(4) The PRS Group, available at http://www.prsgroup.com/CountryData.
aspx/
(5) Rafael La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997);
Rafael La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998);
(6) Mike Alvarez, Jos6 Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi & Adam
Przeworski, ACLP Political and Economic Database Codebook (1996),
available at http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/-cheibub/data/ACLPCodebook.
PDF;
(7) COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS: YEARBOOK 2000
(1999);
(8) THE EUROPA WORLD YEAR BOOK 1999 (1999);
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(9) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, avail-
able at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.
html;
(10) Center for International Development and Conflict Management,
Polity IV Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2007);
(11) Tagish Diplomatic Directory, http://www2.tagish.co.uk/Links/
embassylb.nsf/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2007);
(12) Nancy Brune, Geoffrey Garrett & Bruce Kogut, The International
Monetary Fund and the Global Spread of Privatization, 51 IMF STAFF
PAPERS 195 (2004);
(13) Douglas M. Gibler & Meredith Reid Sarkees, Measuring Alliances:
The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000, 41
J. PEACE RES. 211 (2004); Correlates of War Project, http://cow2.1a.
psu.edu/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
